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The implication of Belgium-linked terrorists in the shootings and bombings on November 13, 2015 in 
Paris — around the Stade de France football stadium, in four pubs and restaurants and the Bataclan 
concert hall — became more and more obvious during the police investigation that followed these 
events. Today we know that the bombings at Brussels Airport and the Maalbeek subway station on 
March 22, 2016 were committed by the same French-Belgian jihadi network.  
 
The consequence has been that many international observers focused on the Belgian police system, 
wondering why the Belgian police forces had not been able to prevent the radicalisation of these 
persons. In this paper we examine this question, explaining what happened during the period that 
preceded these assaults and decoding what the events mean for the Belgian police system today. In 
other words, this paper doesn’t go into the reaction to radicalisation and the subsequent violence 
itself, but into the preventive and pro-active actions that had been undertaken earlier to avoid the 
radicalisation of certain “at-risk” individuals and groups. The main argument we want to develop 
here is that a targeted prevention agenda was largely present in discourse, but to a great extent 
absent in practice. Further, we advocate that, if implemented, this kind of preventive approach 
would have been much more effective than the repressive criminal justice agenda now applied with 
respect to jihadi terrorism. 
 
1. The police reform of 1998 
 
Table 1 : Total capacity of local and federal police as of 31/12/2013 
 
In 1998 the Belgian government reformed the Belgian police system3. Without going into too much 
detail, we observed the transformation of three different police forces into one police system. The 
national gendarmerie, the national judicial (criminal) police and the 589 municipal police forces were 
reorganised into “one integrated police service, structured on two levels”. This meant that two 
different kinds of police forces were created (the federal and zonal police), which were integrated by 
means of functional instruments (such as, for example, a common planning cycle, a shared 
educational programme, the same databases, etc.). The federal component of the system was 
designated as being responsible for supralocal and complex forms of public disorder and crime, 
under the supervision of the minister of internal affairs and of the minister of justice. The local 
component of the system was no longer implemented on the scale of municipalities, but on that of 
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so-called “zones”, which brought the number back to 196 zonal forces4. On average, a zone covers 
three municipalities. Zones were assigned responsibility for local and less complex forms of public 
disorder and crime, with an important focus on prevention, under the supervision of mayors. The 
reform was fully implemented in 2001. No hierarchical link was introduced between the federal and 
zonal levels5. 
 
The reform coincided with an impressive international consensus concerning the inadequacy of 
traditional police models in academic literature, as, for instance, a military-bureaucratic model or a 
crime-fighting model. Summarised, the following critiques can be considered as the most important:  
 (1) A mere increase in the number of police officers is not an effective strategy to tackle 
crime or disorderly behaviour. The quantitative assumption cannot resolve the necessary qualitative 
change of “how to do good policing”.  
 (2) The police cannot prevent crime, and more generally, cannot function without the help of 
the population, which means that the population is much more than “the eyes and ears” of the 
police. The population is to a large extent the most important partner of the police. Police forces 
need to be externally oriented and they have to empower the citizenry.  
 (3) The classic tactics of traditional police models are too reactive, as they do not affect the 
circumstances that cause crime and disorder.  
  (4) Police policy is frequently too broad and is applied to different problems in one and the 
same way (“one size fits all”). Observers advocated the need for “tailor-made responses”6. 
 
As a consequence, the drastic reform was accompanied by the formal introduction of “community-
oriented policing” (COP) as the official philosophy of policing in Belgium. COP is a strategy of policing 
that focuses on the police building ties and working closely with members of communities. It seeks to 
create partnerships between law-enforcement agencies and other organisations such as government 
agencies, community members, non-profit service providers, private businesses and the media, 
which represent a powerful channel through which the police can communicate with the public. 
Community policing recognizes that police cannot solve every public-safety problem alone, so 
interactive partnerships are created in which the public assists the forces in developing problem-
solving solutions. All political parties, majority and opposition, pleaded for this police model, as well 
as parliament and the government. Finally the adoption of COP was consolidated in a circular letter 
distributed by the minister of internal affairs7. COP was embraced to a large extent by the zonal 
police forces but was less visibly implemented within the federal police.  
 
This police model coincided perfectly with the introduction at the municipal level of the so-called 
“Integrated Local Security Policy” (ILSP). The general idea of ILSP is that security matters need to be 
treated in a broad, integral way and are too complex to be tackled by one party. Multidisciplinary 
collaboration between different professionals is essential. ILSP strives for an integrated approach, 
addressing all aspects that can promote security, including root causes of public disorder and crime. 
It is up to the local administrative authority to coordinate this policy between municipal and civilian 
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initiatives (e.g. municipal services, employment and health-care programmes, educators, street-
corner workers, social housing, schools, etc.) and the local police. It is in the framework of ILSP that 
municipalities installed “Local Cells for Integral Security” (LCIS), based on a 2014 circular of the 
ministers of the interior and of justice, with special attention to the problem of counter-terrorism, 
without being mandatory8.  
 
There was some tendency to implement this policy within the police forces, more precisely through 
the “CoPPRa” programme, which stands for “community policing preventing radicalisation and 
terrorism”. CoPPRa started in 2010 as a European Commission “European Action Plan” with a budget 
of four million euros. The CoPPRa project was the result of the cooperation between 11 EU member 
states and the Belgian integrated police led the project. In this framework, COP is used for the 
prevention of radicalisation, while it is built on the confidence of the citizenry in public services at 
local level. CoPPRa is a kind of manual for beat officers on tracing signals of radicalisation at an early 
stage. Belgium has 58 active trainers, which are trained according to the Train the Trainer (TTT) 
concept. They trained some 500 first-line officers and staff from specialised federal and local police 
units during interactive training. In July 2011, the CoPPRa project was prolonged for another two 
years with ISEC funding from the European Commission. In this project, 15 member states and 
CEPOL, the European Police College, participated. 
 
So far, so good. After the police reform, the local police forces and their policymakers had the 
perception that the reorganisation was for the better and to a large extent successful9. How does it 
come then that the radicalisation process of several persons and groups in the Brussels region was 
not successfully observed and prevented by the local forces? 
 
2. The unconditional belief in law enforcement 
 
Belgium, and more precisely the Brussels region, knew a long evolution toward jihadi recruitment 
and radicalisation. It is striking that in these cases the response was only the enforcement of criminal 
law, by supporting the prosecution and sanctioning of offences against this law. As such, policing was 
limited to a reaction to offences already committed and was thus essentially responsive, not 
preventive at all10. 
 
Already in 1992, the self-declared Syrian imam Ayachi Bassam arrived in Molenbeek and founded the 
Belgian Islamist Centre in 1997. The reaction of Belgian authorities was purely a judicial one, indicting 
seven of the leading figures for spreading jihadi propaganda and hate messages via the internet 
when the case came to court in 2012. By then, most of the leading figures had already disappeared 
to fight in Syria and the court could only condemn them in absentia.  
 
In 2010 Fouad Belkacem founded Sharia4Belgium. In September 2012 the organisation dissolved 
itself. Two years later, in September 2014, the judicial process against Sharia4Belgium started against 
45 members, only seven of whom were present in court. All others were judged, again in absentia 
during February 2015. A large number of youngsters had already departed to fight in Syria.  
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There is also the network of Khalid Zerkani, who began recruiting young muslims to fight in Syria and 
Iraq in April 2012. In February 2014, police arrested Zerkani. Thirty-one other people were also 
indicted along with him but by the time the trial opened in spring 2015, most of them had 
disappeared, believed to be in Syria. Among them was Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who would become the 
local organiser of the Paris assaults in November 2015.  In July 2015, Zerkani was sentenced to 12 
years in prison, a term lengthened to 15 years in April 2016 after he appealed it.  
 
In general, we can conclude that an important number of the jihadis recruited in Belgium were 
members of one of the three networks mentioned. Over this long period stretching from 1997 to 
2015, it's clear the policy was focused on building criminal cases against these networks and bringing 
the members to court. It is striking that this strategy always involved a long period of incubation so 
that by the time the cases came before the court most of the suspects had left the country. In other 
words, the criminal procedure was not able to bring a great number of indicted persons to trial. 
According to Belgian Minister of Internal Affairs Jan Jambon (NV-A) in 2015, at least 837 individuals 
were on the watchlist of Belgian intelligence services; 273 of them were reported to be in Syria or 
Iraq, whereas another 134 were believed to have returned to Belgium11. These figures put Belgium at 
the  top of the list of EU countries, in terms of the number of foreign fighters per capita.12.  
 
The alternatives to the law-enforcement strategy have not been sufficiently explored. When we 
researched the prevention of radicalisation in 2010, tasked by the former interior minister, we 
stressed already at that point the importance of a solid preventive approach. This preventive 
approach was advocated by numerous professional respondents, including teachers, educators, 
street-corner workers, youth workers and social workers. They underscored the fact that often they 
were not aware of the meaning of “radicalisation”, how to recognise it and how to deal with 
radicalising youngsters. At that time we advised policy-makers to offer these professionals training in 
preventive instruments, aiming at a deeper understanding of radicalisation, making these 
professionals more sensitive in their professional roles in the prevention of the radicalisation of 
individuals. We also advised to develop a federal centre of knowledge and advice on the issue of 
radicalisation, developing research and evidence-based preventive projects, such as de-radicalisation 
projects in prisons and programmes dealing with parental support, resilience and employment along 
with exit programmes13. The development of such a knowledge centre was never seriously 
considered14. 
 
Since that time there has been no real change in this domain. Recently a collaborator of a Public 
Centre for Social Assistance (PCSA) of a Brussels municipality confessed that social workers had still 
not received any instruction with regard to radicalised individuals, in spite of the fact that this service 
was dealing with individuals known to the security services. More broadly, the staff of the PCSA 
didn’t get any training concerning potentially radicalized individuals, while the PCSA was supposed to 
be involved in identifying signs of radicalisation in the framework of the LCIS’s. Even when some staff 
members asked for training, this was refused because it was considered non-essential.15 Although 
the situation inevitably differs from one PCSA to another, as some cases of good practice are also 
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reported, Belgium seems to be stronger in policy formulation than in the implementation of the 
practices that would carry out the stated goals of that policy. 
 
3. The local police and the municipality treated as orphans  
 
3.1. The lack of co-ordination of the municipal initiative 
 
The federal specialised anti-terror section in Brussels (the so-called “DR3”) only invests 6,8% of its 
capacity (seven people) in preventive missions because of a lack of personnel16. It is clear that 
prevention is primary a local task. But, as a consequence of the lack of a coordinated prevention 
policy, today one municipality has a de-radicalisation policy but not a single foreign terrorist fighter, 
while another municipality has several fighters, but no policy. In Flanders the problem of 
radicalisation is concentrated in Antwerp and Vilvoorde, but about 40 other municipalities also have 
problems. Only 10 of these municipalities are realising a follow-up of “returnees”. Seven of them 
started doing so only recently. In contrast, it is striking that there are also some municipalities which 
are not confronted with Syria fighters (anymore17) but nevertheless still have specific programmes 
and de-radicalisation officials. In fact, in several municipalities nobody knows exactly whether or not 
there are “returnees” on municipal territory18. 
 
By means of an example, let’s have a closer look at the municipality of Molenbeek. Molenbeek 
officially has 95.576 inhabitants and the average age is 34 years, all living on a surface of less than 6 
km2. Certain neighbourhoods have a density of between 30,000–36,000 inhabitants per km2.19 
Between 1995 and 2016, the official population grew from 68,000 to 95,000 inhabitants, without 
taking into account the 5,000 to 9,000 non-documented residents. This explosive growth is the 
consequence of a high birth rate and low mortality rate (because of the high proportion of young 
migrants) and of an important influx of new migrants20. Furthermore, the municipality has a strikingly 
mobile population. When our research group did research in this area in 2012, we observed already 
that the turnover in the population was so significant that even beat officers were not able to 
monitor precisely who was living where. Domicile controls proved to be almost impossible and as a 
consequence were immediately outdated21.  
 
According to the police chief of the police zone Brussels-West, in which the municipality of 
Molenbeek is included, the local police has to accommodate newcomers in houses officially declared 
“uninhabitable" because there is no alternative housing. Furthermore, he claims that there are not 
enough schools to keep up with the rapid population growth22. The drop-out rate of youngsters in 
schools is significant and the population is characterised by a low educational level. The 
unemployment rate is also tremendously high. Amongst youngsters this rate is one of the highest in 
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Europe. Half of young inhabitants between 18 and 25 years stay unemployed, even if they have a 
diploma23.  
 
The chief of police of Brussels-West stresses the fact that there are many associations working in 
Molenbeek, but he claims there is hardly any consultation between these organisations themselves 
or with the zonal police24. Some of the initiatives are supported by the Brussels region, others by the 
Flemish community or the federal government. All of them are doing similar things, but there is an 
obvious lack of coordination. To a large extent we can explain this situation as a consequence of the 
structural position of this municipality within the Brussels Capital Region25. In other words, the 
combined promise of COP and ILSP is surely not satisfied26. 
 
This kind of urban environment is described in the classic study of Samson & Groves27 as a place par 
excellence for the development of adolescent crime careers. This risk increases with the presence of 
recruiters, such as Khalid Zerkani, who lured in youngsters with a criminal background and pushed 
them further along this pathway. He looked for them not in mosques, but in drug-dealing pubs, with 
a apocalyptic story promising a new and better life in Syria. These young Muslims were attracted by 
the dangerous cocktail of risky delinquency and romanticised heroism28. It is in this context that the 
local police of Molenbeek have to function, not only to tackle the demon of terrorism, but to avoid 
that young inhabitants develop delinquent careers in the first place and become outlaws who have 
nothing more to lose.  
 
3.2. The official response: the federal “channel plan” and the regional security plan 
 
In January 2016 the Belgian federal government came with a swift answer to the events in Paris in 
November 2015, “the Federal Action Plan against Violent Extremism and Terrorism”. The 
government translated the problem of terrorism into a quantitative capacity problem. By 2019 the 
government wants to create 1.000 new police posts joining in the struggle against terrorism29. A 
specific part of this action plan is the so-called “Channel Plan” of Interior Minister Jan Jambon. This 
plan envisions 300 new vacancies in the channel zone in Brussels, including the Brussels 
municipalities of Molenbeek, Vilvoorde, Anderlecht, Koekelberg, Laken, Schaarbeek, Sint-Gillis and 
Sint-Joost-ten-Node30. It is remarkable that the federal minister formulated this plan, while the law 
on the integrated police stipulates that local plans are to be formulated by local decision-makers. But 
it is all the more remarkable that the plan supposes an alliance between mayors of specific 
municipalities and not between police zones. Jambon must trust now in the goodwill of many actors, 
and also of a number of socialist (PS) mayors, for realisation of the plan. Molenbeek and Vilvoorde 
are considered in the plan as the most urgent targets. These municipalities got additional capacity 
from February 1, 2016, 50 and 20 new inspectors respectively.  
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The chief of police of Brussels-West commented on the plan, stating that this channel plan does not 
change the structural shortage of 125 inspectors in his force, because the budget for the force did 
not evolve together with population growth. In fact, the Brussel-West force has the lowest budget of 
the Brussels Capital Region. The police zone Brussels-Nord has 25,000 fewer inhabitants but a 
structural capacity of 100 members more than Brussels-West.  
 
In addition to the federal measures, the Brussels region took its own initiative, based on its new 
competences brought by the sixth Belgian state reform in July 2012. Among other goals, this new 
structure foresees financial contributions for regional efforts concerning security31. As a consequence 
of that, the minister-president of the Brussels region, Rudi Vervoort (PS), responsible for security 
since July 1, 2014, presented a plan together with the mayors of Brussels-city, Schaerbeek, 
Anderlecht and Molenbeek simultaneously with Minister Jambon's development of his “channel 
plan”. In this regional plan, “a global and integrated approach” is announced for the problem of 
radicalisation, concentrating on problems of education, youth care, employment, social housing and 
social cohesion. 
 
It is striking that neither plan (the federal “channel plan” of the interior minister nor that of the 
Brussels region) refers to the other one. Instead of a real integrated local security policy, we observe 
a significant decoupling of the federal police strategy and the regional social policy. 
 
3.3. A new “Framework Document for an Integral Security Policy”? 
 
In the meantime, a “Framework Document for an Integral Security Policy” is recently rendered 
public, at the initiative of the ministers of internal affairs and justice, and in consultation with the 
regions and communities, but also with the judicial authorities and municipalities. This framework 
document clarifies the mutual arrangements of the different policy actors in the security field, but 
the working group didn’t reach a satisfying solution for all the problems raised32. While the actual 
government was installed in October 2014, the “Framework Document for an Integral Security 
Policy“ was promised by the end of 2015. The document was only made public at the beginning of 
June 2016 and became more a technical exercise concerning procedures to follow and less the 
development of a shared integrated vision on security. 
 
A serious pitfall is the solution for the so-called “shared professional secrecy”, which is expected to 
bind all actors in the domain of social and health care on the one hand and the police on the other, 
especially concerning persons who become radicalised. The case of Bilal Hadfi is in this respect a 
clear illustration. After the assault on Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015, he demonstrated his 
sympathy for this kind of action in school. His teachers tried to report this, but there was no regular 
means of communication to do so. Hadfi departed to Syria and was later one of the suicide bombers 
in Paris in November 2015. This lack of a shared professional secrecy is an example of precisely the 
kind of problem that lies in the no-man’s land between regions/communities and the federal state. 
Today there is still no clear consensus on this crucial issue.  
 
On top of that, several local police chiefs complain openly about the fact that their local force is 
frequently mobilised to sustain the federal police in the framework of counter-terrorism. These 
chiefs threaten to stop their support to the federal police. They are convinced that this situation is 
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the consequence of dramatic savings at the level of the federal police, hindering basic police 
preventive tasks in the municipalities33. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this article we demonstrated that for a long period a purely reactive law enforcement strategy was 
dominant in counterterrorism in Belgium and a preventive strategy (as a combination of COP and 
ILSP) was largely neglected. A much more active preventive role of the administrative local authority, 
more specifically of the mayors was absent except in rare occasions. In essence, the judiciary has 
monopolised the problem and the administrative and preventive approach was considered in fact as 
less urgent.  
 
To a large extent this was a consequence of the fact that problems of terrorism were considered as 
the caseload of the federal police, with criminal investigation considered the core task of this 
component of the police system. This is the simple corollary of the policy concept politicians have of 
the real nature of police work, namely “tackling crime”, a concept that seems attractive in times of 
austerity. But we know that the influence on crime by the police is very limited. That is essentially 
because the causes of crime are beyond the sphere of influence of the police and these causes can 
only be countered by means of a mature and concrete concept of a Local Integral Security Policy. As 
Peter Manning explained already in 1977, the mandate of police is fragile and vulnerable and police 
personnel should be aware that they personify a promise they can never keep34.  
 
Central recommendations that follow from this article are: 
 Counterterrorism needs a more balanced effort between a law-enforcement strategy and a 
tailor-made preventive approach.  
 Domicile controls are essential in a COP context.  
 Furthermore, this implies the implementation of concrete collaborative multi-disciplinary 
practices between different professions.  
 This implies also the resolution of the problem of “shared professional secrecy”, with respect for 
the standpoints of all the actors involved and not only that of the police. 
 The steering of security and counterterrorism policy is problematic in the Brussels Capital Region, 
because of the different policy layers (19 municipalities, six police zones, the region and the 
federal government). A real fusion of the 19 municipalities into one, and consequently the fusion 
of the six police zones, would bring an important policy focus.  
 This would require that the minister-president functions at the same time as the mayor of 
Brussels, as is the case in Berlin35. It is essential to unify decision-making power in one hand in 
Brussels. 
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